Indigenous Peoples vs. Peasant Unions: Land Conflicts and Rural Movements in Plurinational Bolivia by Fontana LB
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This work is licensed under a  
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence 
 
 
Newcastle University ePrints - eprint.ncl.ac.uk 
 
Fontana LB. Indigenous Peoples vs. Peasant Unions: Land Conflicts and Rural 
Movements in Plurinational Bolivia. Journal of Peasant Studies 2014, 41(3), 
297-319. 
Copyright: 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Peasant Studies 
on 23rd April 2014, available online:  
DOI link to article: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2014.906404  
Date deposited:   
17/01/2018 
For Peer Review Only
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indigenous Peoples vs Peasant Unions:  
Land Conflicts and Rural Movements in Plurinational Bolivia 
 
 
Journal: Journal of Peasant Studies 
Manuscript ID: FJPS-2013-0081.R3 
Manuscript Type: Regular research article 
Keywords: 
Bolivia, Land conflict, Agrarian reform, Indigenous movements, Peasant 
unions 
  
 
 
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/fjps  Email: JPS.Editorial@gmail.com
Journal of Peasant Studies
For Peer Review Only
 1
Indigenous Peoples vs Peasant Unions: 1 
Land Conflicts and Rural Movements in Plurinational Bolivia
1
 2 
 3 
 4 
Abstract 5 
Agrarian reforms do not constitute linear processes: rather, they are based on the 6 
interconnection between the crystallization of land governance in formal tenure 7 
rules and the way societies organize around a set of identities and power 8 
mechanisms. This paper focuses on how the misinterpretation of this two-way 9 
relationship, in setting up a new normative framework, can generate unintended 10 
consequences in terms of conflict. The recent wave of land conflicts in Bolivia 11 
shows how changes in the allocation of strategic resources inspired by the so-called 12 
‘politics of recognition’ triggered processes of political ethnicization and 13 
organizational fragmentation, eventually contributing to fuelling new tensions 14 
between indigenous groups and peasant unions.  15 
 16 
Keywords: Bolivia; land conflict; agrarian reform; indigenous movements; peasant 17 
unions.  18 
 19 
 20 
Introduction  21 
 22 
2013 marks the 60th anniversary of Bolivian agrarian reform. In 1953, in Ucureña, 23 
a small village in the inter-Andean valleys of Cochabamba province, the then 24 
President and leader of the national revolution, Víctor Paz Estenssoro, signed the 25 
decree that started the first large-scale land distribution of Bolivian history. In 26 
2006, in the same village, the newly-elected president Evo Morales launched the 27 
so-called ‘mechanized agrarian revolution’. Over nearly 60 years, the Bolivian 28 
agrarian legislation was repeatedly revised and the very symbolic and political 29 
value of land has shifted from a traditional class-redistributive focus towards 30 
(multi)cultural and social dimensions.  31 
In Latin America, from the 1990s, the paradigm of ethnic recognition2 32 
inspired various regulatory reforms to deal with land tenure, self-determination 33 
claims and indigenous rights (Assies et al. 2000).3 From an empirical grounded 34 
analysis of land conflicts emerging in Bolivia over the past two decades, this 35 
article aims to highlight the limitations of purely economistic approaches to the 36 
agrarian question, as well as indicating the shortcomings of some of the dominant 37 
approaches in collective action studies which share epistemological premises with 38 
the theories of recognition.  39 
                                                      
1 I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers of the article for their useful recommendations. I would 
also like to thank Margo Huxley and Kyle Dexter for their comments and proofreading. 
2 The argument underlying this paradigm is that individual and collective identities are in need of 
recognition and that the negation of this recognition would generate harmful consequences. Indeed, 
blindness to difference has been used to discriminate against others, and the solution to 
discrimination, exclusion and racism should therefore pass through the explicit recognition of 
discriminated identities.  
3 For a comparative discussion on the politics of recognition and the indigenous rights, including 
land governance, in different world regions see Hodgson 2002, Kymlicka 2007, Engle 2010. 
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 2
Bolivia is an interesting case for studying the dynamic relationship between 1 
land-related norms, social movements and conflict. It is one of the countries in 2 
which a set of reforms inspired by the politics of recognition was most radically 3 
and systematically implemented, with important effects on the way strategic 4 
resources are allocated and social differences are renegotiated. This occurred, in 5 
the first place, in the framework of the multicultural institutional reform 6 
implemented by neoliberal governments in the 1990s, and, more recently, in the 7 
so-called MAS’ ‘cultural revolution’. The ‘post-neoliberal’ breakthrough and the 8 
‘Leftist turn’ attributed to the Morales’ government4 have generally attracted 9 
greater attention than have elements of continuity (Prashad and Ballve 2006; 10 
Macdonald and Rückert 2009). However, concerning the management of ethno-11 
cultural diversity and resources, these two periods – the neoliberal and the ‘post-12 
neoliberal’ - show a significant degree of consistency. In particular, the new 13 
Constitution (2009) - and the re-foundation of Bolivia as a Plurinational State - 14 
tends towards strengthening the system of resource allocation and identity 15 
differentiation set up by the neoliberal governments. This does not imply that 16 
significant changes in land allocation were absent. Indeed, the effort by the state to 17 
regain control over large and unproductive areas led to the redistribution of 18 
considerable extensions of land to rural communities5.  19 
After sketching the theoretical framework and summarizing the main 20 
reforms of land governance in Bolivia over the last 60 years, this paper focuses on 21 
the causes and characteristics of intra-societal land conflicts. An analysis of the 22 
Apolo conflict between the Leco indigenous organization and the local peasant 23 
union will show how, in certain contexts, social tensions around land tenure arose 24 
as a consequence of radical organizational and identitarian transformations, under 25 
the influence of broader regulatory and political changes. The emergence of new 26 
conflicts between social movements linked to neoliberal and post-neoliberal 27 
reforms of land governance will be the basis for a critical discussion of three 28 
assumptions embedded in mainstream collective action theories as well as in 29 
normative approaches to identity and recognition: (1) the relationship between 30 
recognition and redistribution in the genesis of social mobilization and in the 31 
process of claims-making; (2) the interchangeable meaning of ‘claims’ and ‘rights’ 32 
and the problematic nature of ideas of emancipation and social justice applied to 33 
land and resource conflicts; (3) the dichotomous portrayal of state vs civil society 34 
as the main framework for the analysis of collective action.  35 
                                                      
4 Post-neoliberalism is defined as a political phase characterized by an effort to build a new social 
consensus that combines the attempt to redirect economic policy by increasing government 
spending, export management and tax reform, with a citizenship project driven mainly by the 
recognition of ethno-cultural differences (Grugel and Raggirozzi 2009).  
5 According to the INRA, private owners had lost control over about 35 million hectares and 
indigenous and peasant people now occupy 55% of the land available in the country. In particular, 
between 2006 and 2012, land under state control increased by more than 23 million hectares, 
mainly due to the expropriation of unproductive lands (Razón 2012). The distribution of 
indigenous collective land was also significant: 8.35 million hectares in the highlands and 13.85 in 
the lowlands.  
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 3
This paper relies on two years’ fieldwork using multiple qualitative methods, 1 
including: 80 interviews with public officers, movements’ leaders, experts and 2 
advisors, conducted between 2010 and 2013; four participatory workshops with 3 
grassroots and social movements’ leaders (July 2010); and content analysis of 4 
national and local press and other documentary materials produced by social 5 
organizations and public institutions. 6 
 7 
Land governance and the politics of recognition 8 
 9 
Land reforms are not purely technocratic processes; they remain ‘intense political 10 
acts’, not only for their redistributive element (Pellegrini and Dasgupta 2011), but 11 
also for their power to influence the way societies are shaped (Bretón 2008, 12 
McNeish 2010, Bottazzi and Rist 2012, Haarstad 2012). From a theoretical point 13 
of view, the study of the relationship between the agrarian issue and social 14 
movements has often focused on how the latter have led struggles and strategies to 15 
pressure the state to reform the legal system of ownership, access and exploitation 16 
of the national territory (Hylton and Thomson 2007). With some significant 17 
exceptions (Assies 2002, McNeish 2010), less attention has been devoted to the 18 
retroactive effects of such changes in the legal system on the social body, i.e. the 19 
process of re-shaping rural collective identities, group interests and conflict linked 20 
to land governance reforms.  21 
For instance, these aspects are not included in purely economic approaches 22 
focused on the possession, distribution and management of land primarily intended 23 
as a productive good (Bottazzi and Rist 2012). Nor are they properly addressed 24 
through sociological theories that consider social movements (and their identities) 25 
as exogenous variables, i.e. as drivers of change rather than social actors involved 26 
themselves in a continuous process of adaptation to the context. In this sense, the 27 
line of interpretation was at first one of redistributive justice and development 28 
(corresponding to twentieth century Marxist-inspired and nationalist revolutions) 29 
(Alexander 1974, Duncan and Routledge 1977, Baranyi et al. 2004) and at a later 30 
stage, one of ethnic recognition (corresponding to the so-called ‘new social 31 
movements’ and ‘neoindigenism’) (Rivera 1984, Escobar and Alvarez 1992, 32 
Yashar 2005, Postero 2006, Van Cott 2007, Gustafson 2009).  33 
The latter were deeply influenced by the theory of recognition (Taylor 1994, 34 
Honneth 1995, Kymlicka 2001), which, from the 1980s, has become one of the 35 
most widespread theses in political philosophy, and was subsequently transplanted 36 
to the social sciences. One of its main assumptions is that our identity is shaped by 37 
recognition – and also by its absence. Within the literature on identity-politics, 38 
recognition is connected not so much to the universal right to equal respect, as to a 39 
group’s specific cultural configuration. Identity politics are based on the idea that 40 
in the name of the survival of a given collectivity, a universal form of recognition 41 
is not enough. Taylor (1999, 29) defines identity politics as aiming at “recognizing 42 
[a given group] in its particularity”. This would be even truer in the case of 43 
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 4
collective identities, grounded on cultural traditions that have the right to be 1 
preserved.  2 
The theory of recognition had a great impact on the way in which the 3 
indigenous question was framed in Latin America6. From the 1980s, a new 4 
international logic gained importance, which was based on the assumption that the 5 
indigenous issue had to be addressed through a series of special measures, which 6 
in principle constituted exceptions to the post-war set of international rules 7 
regarding ethno-cultural minorities. In particular: the recognition of land claims, 8 
language rights and customary law, and groups’ aspirations to exercise control 9 
over their own institutions.  10 
Under the influence of this theoretical and normative framework, measures 11 
were taken at the state level to introduce new collective rights for indigenous 12 
peoples (Lucero 2006, Van Cott 2007) and international development institutions 13 
started to actively promote indigenous organizations in the effort to prioritize 14 
cultural claims, which appeared to be more compatible with the neoliberal model 15 
(Bretón 2008).  One of the major and more widespread set of reforms concerned 16 
the governance of land and territory. This was mainly developed in response to 17 
widespread claims of the indigenous movements, for whom territory progressively 18 
became a powerful binding medium for local group identification (Sawyer 1997, 19 
Perrault 2001). A new generation of land governance reforms was implemented, 20 
which, among the main innovations, included the institutionalization and effective 21 
implementation of collective and customary property rights.  22 
Under the influence of post-modern thinking (‘new social movements’ and 23 
postcolonial), the rise of the indigenous issue in the political agenda has often been 24 
read as a process of ‘empowerment of subaltern groups’ and as the way through 25 
which new rights and participation spaces were achieved. As a consequence, the 26 
accent has been put on ethnic- or gender-specific sociological categories and 27 
cultural subjects, while the role of ‘the economic’ - and of land as a strategic 28 
resource - have been either denied or downgraded (Brass 1991). In contrast, I 29 
argue that, beyond the symbolic nature of cultural struggles, analysis of conflicts 30 
over land must account for both its redistributive dimension as well as for changes 31 
in cultural and identity recognition. From a theoretical perspective, some attempts 32 
have been made to reconcile these two viewpoints (De Sousa Santos 2001, Fraser 33 
2003). This complementarity nevertheless failed to achieve a consistent analytical 34 
paradigm for the study of the relationship between resources allocations (through 35 
governance reforms) and intra-societal conflicts. This paper addresses the 36 
challenge of considering redistribution and recognition simultaneously through a 37 
multidimensional analysis of contemporary conflicts between social organizations 38 
in rural Bolivia. The study includes a mid-term historical trajectory of land 39 
                                                      
6 The situation has been slightly different in Africa. Yet also in this context, an over-emphasis on 
the ethnic element has been pointed out by a growing number of scholars. Different types of 
conflicts - from sporadic, localized violence to protracted civil and cross-border wars - have been 
read through ethnic lenses, obscuring the fact that most of them are linked simultaneously to 
‘preoccupations about land’ and to ‘contests over political power’ (Peters 2004, 271).  
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 5
governance reforms, an empirically grounded analysis of contemporary conflicts 1 
between social organizations, and discussion of some general theoretical 2 
implications.  3 
 4 
Sixty years of agrarian reform 5 
 6 
As in many other Latin American countries, in Bolivia the territorial issue has 7 
been a field of unresolved tensions and cyclical struggles since the formation of 8 
the state 200 years ago (de Janvry and Ground 1978, Kay and Urioste 2007). In the 9 
first half of the XX century, Bolivian agriculture consisted primarily of three 10 
different kinds of productive relationships: feudal-style relations typical of large 11 
and medium-sized haciendas, involved in export-oriented production, especially in 12 
the Santa Cruz region; a subsistence economy of local (indigenous) communities 13 
based on the combination of private and collective land ownership, mainly in the 14 
highlands and valleys; and a small sector of free production based on family labor 15 
working their own prop rties. The agrarian reform of 1953 targeted the feudal-16 
style relationship by attempting to eliminate the system of bondage that supported 17 
hacienda production while strengthening rural peasant unions (Paz Ballivián 18 
2009). This, however, was only partially effective in the Andean highlands, where 19 
it failed to satisfactorily resolve the demand for land and eventually resulted in 20 
land parcelization. At the same time, during the 1960s, there was an acceleration 21 
in the occupation of the eastern tropical lowlands, which led to the formation of 22 
huge landholdings, which were surrounded by smallholding colonists (Assies 23 
2002). Indigenous communities were formally granted collective titles, but this 24 
was not implemented in practice.  25 
Between 1953 and 1993, 52% of Bolivian land was re-distributed with very 26 
different impact depending on the region. In the highlands and valleys, tenants and 27 
peasants received a significant amount of land from the expropriation of the 28 
haciendas, while in the lowlands redistribution strengthened the patronage system 29 
and the agro-industrial speculative bourgeoisie. At the same time, the peasant 30 
movement was fragmented by internal fights generated by the efforts of the 31 
political elites - especially during the Barriento’s dictatorship - to co-opt part of 32 
the peasant leadership (an emblematic case is the series of conflicts in 33 
Cochabamba known as the Champa Guerra; Calderón and Dandler 1984, Gordillo 34 
2000). Moreover, new groups linked to the state and the unions’ bureaucracy 35 
grew, which used power in the detriment of the peasant sector. This also generated 36 
new conflicts between peasant communities and neighborhood cholos, i.e. the 37 
village elites who traditionally played a role as intermediaries between central and 38 
local administrative levels (Calderón 2010). Ultimately, this first round of land 39 
reform was not successful in sustainably addressing inequality or in contributing to 40 
socio-economic development (Bottazzi and Rist 2012).  41 
A second pivotal moment in agrarian reform was the approval of Law 1715 42 
(Law of the National Institute of the Agrarian Reform, INRA) in 1996 under the 43 
neoliberal government of Sanchez de Losada. Some of its main innovations were 44 
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 6
the distinction between individual and collective land tenure rights and the 1 
introduction of the Tierra Comunitaria de Orígen (TCO), institutionalizing the 2 
collective titling of large areas of land to social organizations formally recognized 3 
as indigenous (Map 1). This type of property is inalienable, indivisible, collective, 4 
non-mortgageable and tax free, which implies limitations to private property rights 5 
and thus to accumulation (Regalsky 2010). This new form of collective tenure 6 
accelerated the titling process for indigenous land because of the relative ease of 7 
mapping the perimeter of large land areas and then issuing a single property title. 8 
This was true at least in contexts where no conflicts with third parties and 9 
neighboring landowners were encountered.  10 
The INRA Law also tried to resolve conflicts due to overlapping titles, 11 
which existed mainly due to errors in the implementation of the first agrarian 12 
reform.7 The principle of exclusivity of land property was established. As a 13 
consequence, many community members faced the dilemma of deciding between 14 
individual or collective titling. In the lowlands, indigenous communities 15 
overwhelmingly opted for the TCOs. However, in the Andean region, the growing 16 
demands for TCOs of certain groups eventually increased the conflicts with a high 17 
number of landowners and even entire communities instead claiming for 18 
individual or communal titles.  19 
The INRA law was highly influenced by new international trends (Assies 20 
2007). In 1989, the most important international binding rule on the rights of 21 
indigenous peoples came into force: the 169 Convention of the International 22 
Labour Organization (ILO) on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, which entitled these 23 
groups to special territorial, cultural and self-determination rights. The second part 24 
of the ILO Convention specifically contains provisions on the land rights of 25 
indigenous peoples, stating that ‘The rights of ownership and possession of the 26 
peoples concerned over the lands which they traditionally occupy shall be 27 
recognized’ (Ulfstein 2004, 16). The Convention was ratified by Bolivia in 1991. 28 
The election of Evo Morales in December 2005 inaugurated a new political 29 
era. The land issue was integrated into the first round of reforms of the MAS 30 
government. On 2 June 2006, the President launched seven Decrees, which 31 
provided new guidelines on this matter. Among the most importa t measures was 32 
the commitment to complete the cadastral study (saneamiento) of two to four 33 
million hectares of government-owned land for rural communities. The latter were 34 
now reclassified, no longer as peasant or indigenous, but under the ‘trinitarian’ 35 
concept of ‘indígena originario campesino’ (native indigenous peasant)8. The new 36 
                                                      
7 Overlapping titling affected between 30% and 60% of Bolivian national territory. Up to 60% of 
owners would have had questionable land titles as a result of overlap and irregularities in the 
procedures (Assies 2006).  
8 ‘Native indigenous peasant people or nation is a human collectivity that shares cultural identity, 
language, historical tradition, institutions, territoriality and worldview, the existence of which is 
prior to the Spanish colonial invasion’ (Art. 30 Bolivian Constitution, 2009). The creation of this 
new discursive category capable of unifying all sectors of the rural world within a single indivisible 
concept was one of the most evident manifestations of the cohesive effort undertaken by MAS. For 
an analysis of the category and its political implications see Fontana 2014. 
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 7
legal framework was complemented by two other instruments: Law 3545 (Ley de 1 
Reconducción Comunitaria), enacted in November 2006, and the new 2 
Constitution, approved by referendum in January 2009.  3 
The Constitution includes some principles of the previous body of norms, 4 
such as the enforcement of the Economic and Social Function (FES)9 and 5 
expropriation as mechanisms for combating land concentration. In particular, 6 
Article 398 sets the limit of individual land property at 5000 hectares, although the 7 
resistance of the agribusiness sector led to a lack of retroactive enforcement. In 8 
addition, Article 2 introduces a special type of autonomy for ‘native indigenous 9 
peasant peoples’ (Autonomia Indígena Originario Campesina, AIOC), which - in 10 
contrast to the other three types of autonomy (municipal, departmental and 11 
regional) - relies upon ethno-cultural rather than territorial and administrative 12 
bases (Albó and Romero 2009, Chumacero 2009). According to the Constitution, 13 
the introduction of differentiated sets of rights among different groups of the 14 
population is paramount in the definition of territorial autonomy, to guarantee the 15 
‘exercise of a political, juridical and economic system according to [its 16 
inhabitants’] world view’ (Art. 18).  17 
So far, 18 municipalities have started the procedure for conversion into 18 
indigenous autonomous territorial units. Twelve among them were authorized to 19 
carry out a referendum and on 6 December 2009, 11 voted ‘Yes’. They have 20 
therefore pioneered the implementation of a new ethnic-based system of autonomy 21 
(Salgado 2009).  22 
In general however, the new regulatory framework does not do much in the 23 
way of providing guidelines to help resolve longstanding or new conflicts between 24 
social organizations with incompatible views on land ownership.  25 
 26 
Intra-societal land and identity conflicts  27 
 28 
A land conflict is defined as a social fact where interests of at least two parties 29 
enter into a contradiction in relation to property rights and land use (Wehrmann 30 
2008). In Bolivia, agrarian struggles’ imaginary was often catalyzed by the 31 
conflicts between indigenous communities or landless peasants a d big 32 
landowners, especially in the lowlands (Villanueva 2004). However, more 33 
recently, land conflict has shifted to the western highlands and valleys and has 34 
confronted rural social organizations themselves, becoming predominantly intra-35 
societal (Bottazzi and Rist 2012). As the chief of the Conciliation and Conflict 36 
Management Unit of the INRA explains:   37 
Nowadays, the greatest land conflicts in Bolivia are between native communities and 38 
syndical organizations. These conflicts are more intense than the conflicts between 39 
communities and big landowners, since the latter could be resolved by applying the 40 
new Constitution and the principle of the 5000 hectares, while, for the former, there 41 
                                                      
9 This implies the obligation to use the lands for the well-being and economic development of their 
owners, according to their carrying capacity. 
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 8
are no clear and defined criteria. Ideological and economic problems are at stake, 1 
which, however, are never openly admitted. (La Paz, 26.05.2010)  2 
 3 
Indeed, beyond formal tenure claims, a variety of factors fuel these conflicts, such 4 
as organizational differences, natural resource control, or power and identity issues 5 
that are connected to the land as a productive and social good. 6 
A major cause of rural conflicts in Bolivia is land scarcity provoked by 7 
several factors such as population growth, highly fragmented tenures 8 
(minufundio), and loss of soil fertility. This is coupled with a highly unequal 9 
distribution of land between families and social groups, despite the improvements 10 
registered in recent years.10  11 
The changes at the regulatory level also had important consequences on 12 
intra-societal conflicts. In 1996, the INRA Law instituted a 10-year period for the 13 
saneamiento to regularize property rights throughout the country. In certain cases, 14 
the intensification of conflicts between villages was thus the result of the 15 
acceleration in the process of mapping and formalizing territorial boundaries, 16 
which had remained fluid up until then (Reyes García et al. 2012). In addition, 17 
since its creation, the administrative apparatus of INRA proved to be quite 18 
inefficient and was losing credibility vis a vis social organizations. These 19 
institutional weaknesses worsened situations of conflict due to the impossibility of 20 
INRA acting as a legitimate and reliable mediator. 21 
Moreover, the collectivist policy implemented over the last twenty years – 22 
including the prioritization of TCOs’ titling – created tensions between rural 23 
organizations and a sense of discrimination amongst the peasantry. This fact not 24 
only impacted on the number of conflicts, but also on their nature. Indeed, the 25 
introduction of a link between ethnic belonging and systems of resource allocation 26 
favored the instrumentalization of ethnic identities and contributed to the 27 
radicalization of social tensions.11 Those social groups identifying themselves as 28 
indigenous, and who were formally recognized as such through a system of 29 
                                                      
10 See footnote 3.  
11 Similar effects on social fragmentation, increased competition and intra-communitarian power 
dynamics provoked by the neoliberal reforms has been described by Víctor Bretón (2008) in the 
case of Ecuador. His analysis of the World Bank-led Proyecto de Desarrollo de los Pueblos 
Indígenas y Negros del Ecuador (PRODEPINE) shows a high correlation between the amount of 
resources invested, their number, the number of executive entities and the proportion of indigenous 
population. The project followed essentialised culturalist parameters and, in little more than three 
decades, was responsible for the neglect of structural issues, the privatization and/or externalization 
of development interventions, and a near-exclusive focus on the indigenous population. Ultimately, 
the ethnicization of the indigenous movement through the prioritization of culture and identity 
politics at the expense of the class-based peasant agenda hindered the formation of alliances 
between indigenous groups and other sectors of society and increased the emergence of class 
tensions within indigenous groups themselves.  
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 9
certification issued by the Viceministerio de Asuntos Indigenas y Pueblos 1 
Originarios (VAIPO), had priority to land titling. Critically, the process of 2 
ethnicization contributed to changing the very nature of rural conflicts. The 3 
parties’ positions shifted from resource-based claims to ethno-identitarian issues, 4 
traditionally more resistant to bargained agreements (Taras and Ganguly 2008), 5 
and the conflicts became ethno-political in nature12. The situation was exacerbated 6 
as well by the fact that the TCOs’ titling process was generously funded by 7 
international cooperation agencies13 (Assies 2006), while the budget for peasant 8 
land titling was lower and did not receive international aid. 9 
The discourse of the most important rural movements reflects the plurality of 10 
causes of intra-societal conflicts. On one side, the two main indigenous/native 11 
organizations – the Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia (CIDOB) and 12 
the Cosejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ) – claim the 13 
titling of their territories as TCOs and the protection of their collective rights. 14 
These demands are rooted in a strong ethno-identitarian narrative that have 15 
generally emerged from a recent process of cultural recovery: 16 
 17 
The natives want the titling of their territory to directly guarantee access to natural 18 
resources and to restore our territory and traditional collective life. We all have our own 19 
functions within our principles of rotation, complementarily and reciprocity in our 20 
ayllus
14
 (interview with a CONAMAQ advisor, La Paz, 05.08.2010). 21 
 22 
On the other side, peasants affiliat d to the union (CSUTCB) prefer 23 
individual land titles or, in some cases, communitarian title (one title in name of a 24 
particular community, rather than of the ‘people’), but oppose the TCO, which is 25 
considered an unfair and irrational way of land management. Through a strong 26 
evocative analogy, they define the TCOs as the ‘new latifundio’. Indeed, although 27 
the Peasant Federation was born in the late 1970s under the leadership of the 28 
indianist Katarism movement that was rooted in the tradition of the highlands’ 29 
Aymara and Quechua ‘native nations’, in this new phase, no trace is left of those 30 
origins. Rather, a classist discourse regains strength, which puts emphasis on the 31 
peasant position in the mode of production, but through a narrative that links this 32 
identity with a sort of syndicalist native primordialism15.  33 
 34 
(...) Blood and the surname that runs through the blood of each and every one that lives 35 
in the CSUTCB area is peasant, before indigenous. Peasants, whether farmers, 36 
                                                      
12 Marchetti and Tocci (2011, 55-56) define ethno-political conflicts as “situations in which groups, 
self-defined in ethnic terms, articulate their subject position in mutually incompatible ways”.  
13 A telling example is the 10-year long program of the Danish cooperation (DANIDA) Support to 
the rights of indigenous peoples.  
14 Traditionally the ayllu was an endogamous social unit, which worked the land in a collective 
form in the framework of a commonly owned territory (Rivera Cusicanqui 1993). Nowadays, there 
is considerable variance in the form and meaning of the ayllu, generally defining groups based on 
kinship and virilocality with their own system of land management (McNeish 2002) 
15 This could also inspire further discussion on the new forms that the peasant ‘consciousness’ is 
taking, relying upon identity and recognition rather than “on the firmer base of a concrete system of 
economic or social interrelations” (Hobsbawm 1973, 7).  
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 10
stockbreeders, fishers, llama shepherds - we are identified as peasants. (…) [We] are 1 
from different cultures and languages, but before being ‘indigenous’ [we] recognize as 2 
native peasants (interview with the CSUTCB’s Secretary of Land and Territory, La 3 
Paz, 02.08.2010). 4 
 5 
The processes of identities’ around the categories of ‘indigenous’ and 6 
‘peasant’ are not new in Bolivia. Two key moments can be identified in the 7 
dynamic of articulation/disarticulation of these identities: the period after the 8 
National Revolution of 1952 and the post-dictatorship neoliberal era (1980s-90s).  9 
In the 1950s, a process of massive campesinization imposed the peasant 10 
unions as a new dominant form of rural organization. At the same time, the 11 
affirmation of the mestizaje ideology promoted class-based identities, rather than 12 
ethnic-based identities, as collective mechanisms of self-identification (Sanjinés 13 
2005). In the following 30 years, the very notion of citizenship in the rural world 14 
overlapped with belonging to a peasant union (García Linera 2010). In many 15 
regions of the highlands, however, the new organizational system did not eradicate 16 
traditional regimes of territorial organization (Rivera 1984), which managed to 17 
survive in a more or less symbiotic or conflictive relationship with syndicates.  18 
In the mid-1980s a changing political and economic climate in Bolivia, 19 
combined with important international transformations, created a situation that 20 
undermined both the state policies and the syndicalist tradition of the previous 30 21 
years (McNeish 2002). With the end of the dictatorship and the rise of 22 
neoliberalism, a new movement of revitalization of ethno-cultural identities gained 23 
strength in the lowlands, with the creation of the indigenous organization CIDOB. 24 
About ten years later, a similar process started among some communities of the 25 
highlands, leading to the foundation of the highlands’ native confederation 26 
CONAMAQ (Andolina et al. 2005). As a result, new identitarian contours, mainly 27 
driven by the emergence of new ethnic-based social movements (self-defined 28 
indígena in the lowlands and originario in the highlands) re-shaped Bolivian 29 
social geographies.   30 
The revitalization of the ‘indigenous issue’ and a generalized process of 31 
‘political ethnicization’ cannot be understood without considering the role of 32 
external actors. Indeed, the economic and ideological basis of this change lies, at 33 
least in part, in the actions of international cooperation agencies and some engaged 34 
anthropologists who supported and financed these new indigenous and native 35 
movements (McNeish 2002, Andolina et al. 2005, Bretón 2008, Rodríguez-36 
Carmona 2009). These actions were heavily criticized by the peasant sector, which 37 
accused international agencies of having deliberately favored one social group to 38 
the detriment of the other.  39 
Beyond these accusations, it was clear that since the 1990s, with the creation 40 
and strengthening of new ethno-cultural movements, the corporatist monopoly of 41 
peasant and workers unions was definitively broken. Social organizations 42 
rearticulated around a multi-polar system with two main and opposed poles: the 43 
peasant unions and the native indigenous movements. This process was also 44 
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 11
accelerated by the weakening of the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) as 1 
articulator of popular fights and social claims. Looking at the Bolivian rural 2 
organogram, on the side of the peasant unions are the CSUTCB, the 3 
Confederación de las Mujeres Campesinas Bartolina Sisa (CNMCIOB BS) and 4 
the Confederación de la Comunidades Interculturales (CSCIB), and on the side of 5 
native indigenous movements, CONAMAQ and CIDOB (Fig. 1). The divide 6 
between peasant and indigenous/native sectors has been growing despite the fact 7 
that from 2005, all the major rural movements decided to join a coalition of social 8 
forces to support the MAS. This alliance was paramount to ensure the electoral 9 
victory of Evo Morales, but as it became clear over the following years, he 10 
eventually found himself depending on a quite unstable and conflictive 11 
constituency (Fontana 2013). The fractures between indigenous and peasant 12 
sectors are increasingly evident in the discourse of their respective leaders. Here 13 
are some examples:  14 
 15 
They [the indigenous] do not think for the whole country, they think only for their 16 
landowners and some groups that want to make profit (...). In contrast, the CSUTCB 17 
has always thought through a structural economic and political perspective of state 18 
unity (interview with the CSUTCB Land and Territory Secretary, cit.).  19 
 20 
The three national movements - CSUTCB, Bartolinas and Interculturals – are our  21 
wawa qhallus [‘sons’, ‘children’]. They don’t have territory. They are in our territory 22 
(interview with a CONAMAQ leader, La Paz, 05.08.2010). 23 
 24 
At the local level, the fight between peasant and indigenous organizations 25 
was manifested mainly in the effort to strengthen control of their political power. 26 
In certain cases, the leaders carried out ‘conversion campaigns’ to persuade people 27 
to join their organization, taking advantage of the strong corporatist sense present 28 
in the Bolivian population, the ambivalence and fluidity of collective identities and 29 
the endemic scarcity of economic resources. This is how a former advisor of 30 
CONAMAQ described the native proselytism:  31 
 32 
There are leaders who enter the peasant territories to convince people. They go and 33 
put native authorities where once there was the peasant union (...). For many leaders 34 
of CONAMAQ, reconstitution means controlling the peasant communities that, 35 
before, were part of their ancestral territories. This is exactly the root of the 36 
ideological and political conflicts that exist in the local ambit. The members of the 37 
peasant Federation do not want to be reconverted into indigenous (interview with a 38 
former advisor of CONAMAQ, La Paz, 30.06.2010).  39 
 40 
In some cases, the initial situation was quite clear in terms of identity and 41 
cultural features, such as in many areas of the highlands where Quechua and 42 
Aymara people preserved their language, culture and traditional organizational 43 
structures, although sometimes adapting to the syndical system. In other areas, 44 
where indigenous groups were smaller and more vulnerable to external shocks, 45 
many of the local cultural, linguistic and identitarian traits were lost. Here, the 46 
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 12
identity revitalization was more complex, generating in certain cases, ethnogenesis 1 
processes16. The rise of new indigenous groups is a telling example of the 2 
ethnicization dynamic that Bolivia is experiencing, and in certain contexts, it is at 3 
the origin of new intra-societal conflicts.  4 
 5 
Indigenous Leco vs. Peasant Federation: The land conflict in Apolo 6 
 7 
An interesting case of ethnogenesis concerns the Leco people of Apolo, an 8 
Amazonian municipality in the North-West of Bolivia. Here the creation of a new 9 
ethnic-based organization (Central Indígena del Pueblo Leco, CIPLA) triggered a 10 
conflict with the local peasant union (Federación de Campesinos de la Provincia 11 
Franz Tamayo, FSUTC-FT), which, in 2007, reached frightening peaks of 12 
violence and still remains unsolved at the time of writing.  13 
The conflict in Apolo originated in the mid-1990s, as a consequence of a 14 
combination of events. At the national level, in October 1996 the INRA Law was 15 
approved, introducing the TCO as a form of collective land titling for native and 16 
indigenous peoples. At the local level, the FSUTC-FT - at that time the only 17 
organic organization in the region - was upset by divisions among its leaders. In 18 
1997, a breakaway group decided to found a new indigenous movement: the 19 
CIPLA. They rapidly made contact with local communities and instituted a form 20 
of discourse based on ethno-identitarian claims and on the revival of culture, 21 
traditions, routines and customs of the Leco people. 22 
The Leco was one of the four dominant groups in the Apolo region in the 23 
16th and 17th centuries (together with the Aguachiles, Tacanas and Quechuas). 24 
Following colonization by the Inca and then the Spanish, the Leco mixed with 25 
populations of different cultural and ethnic origins.17 A few traces of their 26 
language and traditions still survive among contemporary Apolo inhabitants. It is 27 
important to note, however, that nowadays no evident cultural, physiognomic or 28 
class markers distinguish subgroups among the local population. According to the 29 
Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (INE), 93.13% of the population of Apolo is poor 30 
(2001). Seventh-nine per cent of the Apoleños speak Quechua, 18% Spanish, 1% 31 
Aymara, and 0.27% speak other native languages. According to self-identification 32 
criteria, 72% identify themselves as Quechua, 15% do not identify with any 33 
indigenous peoples, 10% as native or other indigenous peoples, and 3% identify 34 
themselves as Aymara (INE and UNDP 2006).   35 
                                                      
16 Processes of creation of new ethnic identities in which members of a collectivity recognize and, 
affirm themselves as different from other groups’ members and from the social environment. 
17 In the 19th and 20th centuries, with economic growth and the decline of the missions, there was 
a migration wave towards the region, which facilitated the imposition of the Quechua, the 
weakening of the Leco, and the appearance of Spanish as the new lingua franca. Migrants came to 
Apolo attracted by possibilities of employment related to the quinina and rubber industries. These 
changes in the local economy favoured the rise of the hacienda and of a local non-indigenous elite. 
The subordination of the local population to the hacienda system continued until the latter half of 
the 20th century, when the National Revolution started the process of land redistribution and 
promoted the creation of the peasant workers’ unions (Assies 2002, Sotomayor 2009). 
Page 12 of 28
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/fjps  Email: JPS.Editorial@gmail.com
Journal of Peasant Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 13
Soon after its creation, the CIPLA was included in the network of the 1 
Eastern indigenous movements, joining the Central de Pueblos Indígenas de La 2 
Paz (CPILAP) at the departmental level, and the CIDOB at the national level. 3 
According to its statute, the organization works following an ‘identity-based 4 
development model’ articulated around four points: (1) organizational 5 
strengthening; (2) territorial consolidation through the recuperation of traditional 6 
lands; (3) territorial planning based on sustainable management of natural 7 
resources; and (4) promotion of sustainable productive alternatives and the 8 
exercise of indigenous autonomy as a form of self-government and self-9 
determination (CPILAP 2009). The issue of land and territory is indeed one of the 10 
key features of CIPLA’s development model. In its Strategic Plan it is stated that:  11 
 12 
We consider it vital to guarantee the consolidation of the land-territory in favor of the 13 
indigenous peoples, in quantity and quality enough to ensure their harmonic and 14 
sustainable development, according to their values and practices, identities, space 15 
visions and conceptions, and priorities (CPILAP 2009). 16 
 17 
Moving towards the achievement of these goals, in 1999 the CIPLA 18 
submitted to INRA a demand for the titling of the TCO-Leco for a total of 654.000 19 
hectares. At the same time, the organization received the official recognition of the 20 
Viceministry (VAIPO), which issued the Certification of Ethnic Identity and 21 
Actual Settlement. The VAIPO declared that ‘the claimant people maintain their 22 
own identity and cultural practice as indigenous native people’, and that this 23 
corresponds to the ‘Leco Indigenous People/Quechua Native People’. This is a 24 
highly ambiguous denomination that eventually brought about problems in the 25 
relationship with the peasants.18  26 
Between 1995 and 2005, 17 out of 86 communities in the Apolo 27 
municipality joined the CIPLA (Sotomayor 2009). In general, the fact that a 28 
community decided to join the indigenous organization was linked to the role 29 
played by local leaders, to the awareness of an indigenous past among the local 30 
population, as well as to pre-existing tensions and power dynamics at the local 31 
level. The case of the Torewa community illustrates the complexity of this 32 
process. Torewa is a very isolated community in the heart of the Madidi National 33 
Park. Here, two factors played a major role in the shift from the peasant union to 34 
the indigenous organization (interview with a leader of the Torewa community, La 35 
Paz, 08.08.2013). On the one side, one of the CIPLA leaders migrated to the area 36 
at the beginning of the 1990s, after ‘loosing the battle’ against the peasants in his 37 
native community near Apolo. His role as intermediary between CIPLA and local 38 
people was fundamental. On the other side, in the 1990s, some initiatives were 39 
started to create eco-touristic projects in this area under the coordination of non-40 
                                                      
18
 One of the ex-officers of the Vice-Ministry in charge of the process of certification explains: 
‘We recommended calling the TCO “Leco-Quechua”, to acknowledge the presence of Quechuas in 
the area. However, INRA did not consider our recommendation and started the cadastral study as 
TCO Leco’ (interview, La Paz, 05.08.2010).  
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native professionals, which sympathized with the peasant Federation. Part of the 1 
community was not happy with this initiative, which was perceived as ‘coming 2 
from outside’ and not benefitting the community. The affiliation to the CIPLA and 3 
the titulation of the TCO contributed to neutralize those projects. Yet, a similar 4 
initiative of community-led eco-tourism is currently being developed by CIPLA 5 
leaders and sponsored by the Indigenous Fund.  6 
In 2002, the demand of the TCO-Leco was included within the funding 7 
plan of the Danish cooperation, and in 2003, the cadastral study begun. The area 8 
was divided into three zones. The study of Zone 1 (almost completely included 9 
within the Madidi National Park) was relatively quick (4 months), and in 10 
November 2006, INRA issued the first title for the TCO-Leco (Map 2). This fact 11 
triggered the most violent phase of the conflict, which catalyzed all the tensions 12 
that had been growing over the years between the peasant and indigenous 13 
organizations. In May-June 2007, the conflict reached a critical phase: the peasants 14 
started to mobilize, firstly with marches, blockades, hunger strikes, occupying 15 
public buildings and, as an extreme measure, with the invasion of the protected 16 
area of the Madidi Park. The occupants threatened to start cutting down trees, if 17 
the government did not listen to their claims. These claims were, in brief: the 18 
construction of a road between Apolo and Ixiamas (cutting across the Park), the 19 
beginning of hydrocarbon exploration19, and the cancellation of Zone 1 titling 20 
(Razón 2007).  21 
After three attempts at negotiation by the government, a minimal agreement 22 
was reached and tensions calmed down. The peasants presented a motion to the 23 
National Agrarian Tribunal (TAN) asking for the revocation of the TCO-Leco. 24 
Since then, there has been an improvement in the titling, mainly of the peasant 25 
areas, since INRA feared that entrance into contested territories would provoke a 26 
new wave of mobilization and violence. This worry became even stronger after the 27 
rejection of the peasant demand by the TAN in January 201020. Ultimately, the 28 
conflict still lacks a sustainable solution and there appear to be no reliable 29 
institutions able to lead an effective mediation process.  30 
Not only do social actors themselves have divergent collective memories of 31 
the main historical phases of the conflict, but they also continue narrative 32 
apparatuses of ‘self’ and ‘otherness’ that contribute to the perpetuation of tensions. 33 
In both narratives, there is evidence of how identity plays an instrumental role as a 34 
tool to gain advantages in the political struggle and to adapt to the context, 35 
responding to international, national and local opportunities and constraints.  36 
                                                      
19 On 13 May 2007, the government issued a decree that authorized the exploitation and 
exploration of energy resources in Apolo (Diario 2007). 
20 The main arguments of the decision were that the Federation had no legitimacy to demand the 
revocation of the Zone 1, since the protected area of the Madidi Park could only be dealt with 
under the provisions of the TCO. Moreover, the existence of a Pre-Inca and pre-republican Leco 
people was confirmed. It was clarified that ‘the Leco people exercise possession for the use and 
traditional exploitation of this territorial area for its 17 communities’ and that ‘their language is the 
Leco, but that they also speak Quechua and Spanish’. This judgment therefore favoured indigenous 
groups’ rights over the peasants groups’ claims to titles (TAN 2010). 
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 15
Affiliates of the indigenous organization describe the conflict as a struggle 1 
for their rights and the recovery of their cultural identity, routines and customs, 2 
and native origins. They do not deny their past within the Peasant Federation and 3 
they refer to the separation as a process of emancipation, motivated by the need to 4 
find the historical roots of Apolo. This break gave birth to an ‘organization with 5 
identity’ - the CIPLA.  6 
 7 
From that day on we started to rescue all our traditions and customs, we are true 8 
indigenous with identity. Therefore, we had also to suffer a bit with the brothers of 9 
the Federation…they maltreated us, kidnapped and flagellated us. (…) Those are the 10 
roots of the claim for our culture (workshop with CIPLA’s leaders, Apolo, July 11 
2010).  12 
 13 
We keep on strengthening the fight for our rights and for the reproduction of our 14 
cultural identity (...). When we discovered that the Leco existed here, that they 15 
organized a resistance, their way of living and all those things, thus, this was the root 16 
of Apolo. This is the identity, and we have got possession of this identity (interview 17 
with a CIPLA’s leader, La Paz, August 2010).  18 
 19 
 For the members of the CIPLA, the most important difference between a 20 
Leco and a Quechua lies in their vision of their worlds: the indigenous is 21 
community-oriented and has close ties with nature, while the peasant is 22 
individualist and ‘emerges’ from the colonial past. Nevertheless, the criteria for 23 
affiliation with CIPLA seem to be quite blurred and do not imply strict 24 
requirements, but simply the will to individually self-identify as indigenous. More 25 
concrete elements that would prove the contemporary existence of the Leco are the 26 
language (although, according to the indigenous leaders, it is currently spoken 27 
only by a few elders in small remote communities) and its traces in toponymy, as 28 
well as typical local dances attributed to the Leco tradition.  29 
Conflictive elements clearly emerge by comparing the Lecos’ statements 30 
with the discourse of the peasants. The union uses the same rhetorical tools as 31 
those of the indigenous group, but in order to highlight the inconsistency of the 32 
indigenous identity. In particular, the fact that the Leco language is no longer 33 
spoken by people would invalidate the legitimacy of the claim for recognition. 34 
Moreover, the members of the Federation deny the existence of typical Leco 35 
surnames and they consider the Leco dance a local cultural feature shared by all 36 
the communities as a memory of the old inhabitants of the region.  37 
 38 
There is only one Quechua people, native Quechua. In reality, these Leco people are 39 
only supposed Leco, since they do not exist. Even in their own surnames, they don’t 40 
have anything native. All their surnames are Spanish, while in the Federation we still 41 
have native [Quechua] surnames (workshop with peasant Federation’s leaders, 42 
Apolo, 07.2010).  43 
 44 
According to the peasants, the Leco people are neither recognized nor 45 
legitimate, and their claim to Leco identity is an issue of ‘belief’ that has no ties 46 
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with what really matters, i.e. the roots and the ancestors. In the peasant narrative, 1 
there is an alternative narrative of origin, which strengthens the present situation 2 
(‘we are syndicalists’) by sinking their roots into an ancestral past (‘we have 3 
always been syndicalists’):  4 
 5 
Forever, from our ancestors, we have been syndicalists. We belong to the 6 
departmental Federation. But now the fellows [the Lecos] believe they are another 7 
organization. They believe that they are well linked to the government. They want to 8 
diminish us through concealments, misleading us (workshop with peasant 9 
Federation’s grassroots, Puhchaui community, 07.2010). 10 
 11 
The members of the Federation have a strong native feeling: by no means do 12 
they consider themselves colonizers. For that reason, there is great resentment of 13 
the CIPLA, which puts emphasis on the ‘non-nativeness’ of the peasants: ‘They 14 
treat us as settlers, as the Spanish that arrived here. We are not settlers (…) We are 15 
native. Our grandfathers were born in these lands’ (workshop with peasant 16 
Federation’s grassroots, Puhchaui community, July 2010). For the peasants, the 17 
process of identity recognition is grounded in verifiable data (such as the place of 18 
birth, the language and blood ties), more than in the kind of self-identification 19 
process that is valued by the CIPLA.  20 
However, within the peasant syndicate, discordant visions around identity 21 
issues also coexist. By the second half of 2010 (at the time of my fieldwork), 22 
during a Federation meeting (ampliado), some peasant leaders proposed changing 23 
the name of the organization to ‘Native Indigenous Quechua’21. The argument was 24 
that this would improve the position of the organization with the government and 25 
international community, enhancing chances of gaining access to economic 26 
resources. Moreover, in some areas where there are conflicting land claims, 27 
‘putting the CIPLA members in a minority’ could be a tactical solution, using an 28 
identity-based demographic parameter as a conflictive tool. 29 
This brief analysis of the conflict in Apolo provides an example of how the 30 
reforms on land governance inspired by the politics of recognition have worked ‘in 31 
practice’ in a context characterized by high levels of poverty, a dynamic social 32 
environment and a history of colonization and mestizaje that, however, didn’t 33 
cancel memories and traditions of other peoples and identities. The discursive 34 
space becomes a privileged ‘battle field’. Linguistic representations contribute to 35 
generating a collective feature of the adversary, while at the same time, 36 
dialectically influencing the representation of the ‘self’. This ‘self’ is mainly built 37 
in opposition to what the enemy is or is assumed to be. In the words of Noel 38 
Castree (2004, 152), ‘This is more than just a semantic issue of signifiers and 39 
signifieds. It is also an issue of how identities are claimed or made, on how 40 
“insiders” and “outsiders” are created through the identification process, and how 41 
real place-projects are pursued in the name of these identities’.  42 
                                                      
21
 A similar discussion, taking place in the late 1990s in the Santuario de Quillacas municipality, is 
reported in McNeish 2002.  
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 1 
Conclusions 2 
 3 
This article has analyzed the conflict over land between social organizations 4 
(peasant vs indigenous) in the light of the latest phase of the Bolivian agrarian 5 
reform. I have argued that the new type of land governance - which introduced 6 
identitarian criteria for the allocation of property rights - is one of the main factors 7 
that can explain the rise of new ethnic-based intra-societal tensions. The empirical 8 
evidence presented also contributes to challenging three assumptions often 9 
embedded in mainstream conflict and social movement theories as well as in 10 
normative approaches to identity and recognition: (1) the relationship between 11 
recognition and redistribution in the genesis of social mobilization and in the 12 
process of claims-making; (2) the interchangeable meaning of ‘claims’ and ‘rights’ 13 
and the problematic nature of ideas of emancipation and social justice applied to 14 
land and resource conflicts; (3) the dichotomy of state vs civil society as the main 15 
framework for the analysis of collective action.  16 
(1)  Recognition vs. redistribution: This article has questioned the 17 
relationship between the social construction of collective behaviors and identities 18 
and strategic thought and action. I argue that norm-based collective claims and 19 
behaviors cannot be explained only by preferences that are entirely material, nor 20 
by purely ideological, cultural or identitarian arguments. This would imply not a 21 
resource vs identity model, but a multi-dimensional analytical framework, which 22 
includes both ‘interests’ and ‘passions’ (Hirschman 1974), social reproduction and 23 
recognition, identity and resources. Beyond the complementarity between 24 
recognition and redistribution that has already been pointed out in theoretical 25 
literature, I would like to challenge the way the very concept of ‘recognition’ has 26 
traditionally been used.   27 
Generally, the discourse on recognition tends to establish a link between 28 
certain types of social movements (identity or ethnic-based) and claims for 29 
recognition (Kymlika 2001, Postero and Zamosc 2004, Stavenhagen 2007, 30 
Canessa 2012). This is achieved by presenting these claims under the form of 31 
demands for rights, justice and citizenship. However, in certain cases, this implies 32 
a highly normative interpretation of recognition and an essentialized vision of 33 
identity. The empirical evidence presented in this paper shows how recognition is 34 
a necessary attribute for each and every collective actor. This is illustrated by 35 
analyzing how different organizations (indigenous and peasant) manage to ensure 36 
a certain degree of identitarian autonomy (illustrated by Barth’s idea of 37 
boundaries, 1998), differentiation (as the set of mechanisms that regulate access to 38 
a social group), and power control. In this sense, recognition is not a prerogative of 39 
identity-based social movements, but a need of all social groups and individuals. 40 
As Hannah Arendt (1958) pointed out, identity is not so much a substance as a 41 
requirement: that of knowing (and being able to define) whom we are dealing 42 
with. To recognize is first and foremost the operation through which an observer 43 
identifies something or someone as durable and different from whatever surrounds 44 
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it. Hence, recognition operates by selecting those identities that enable the 1 
establishment of a cognitive order in a differentiated social landscape.   2 
Therefore, it would be more appropriate to talk about recognition needs, 3 
where recognition is a general form of identitarian distinction that includes a 4 
plurality of elements (not only ethnicity) and that is compatible with strategic 5 
decisions. Moreover, recognition could be a need that is not necessarily beneficial 6 
for the whole population, but, in certain cases, responds to the agenda of a small 7 
group, e.g. an elite or a few leaders. In this sense, recognition claims cannot be 8 
understood only through the lenses of rights. The dimensions of power and 9 
interests must be considered as well.  10 
(2) Rights vs. Claims: Interpretative frameworks employed to understand 11 
Latin American ethno-cultural movements often assume an empirical coincidence 12 
between claims and rights: social movements claim for the effective entitlement of 13 
rights, and consequently, a state that is responsive to those claims would 14 
contribute to the widening and deepening of the ‘citizenship frontier’. These are 15 
often embedded assumptions in those scholarly works influenced by recognition 16 
and theories of new social movements. Although there is often a complementarity 17 
between rights and claims, I consider it useful to keep them separated at the 18 
analytical level. I argue that social movements’ claims can be in the name of 19 
expanding the access to certain rights, but not always and not only. In fact, 20 
processes of claims-making are often complex, and more than coincidentally, they 21 
imply an interdependent relationship between claims and rights.  22 
Another step could be to consider norms (and norms’ changes) as 23 
independent variables (instead of the goals of social movements, as is often the 24 
case in collective action studies). This theoretical shift enables a highlighting of 25 
how institutional changes contribute to re-shaping social movements’ claims and 26 
identities, triggering mechanisms of both resistance and adaptation. In the case of 27 
the Apolo conflict, both dynamics co-exist: following contextual (regulatory) 28 
changes, some leaders responded through a process of adaptation, re-framing their 29 
identities and claims in ethno-cultural terms (Lecos). This fact triggered conflict 30 
with another section of the local leadership (peasants), which decided to resist the 31 
change for ideological and pragmatic reasons (disagreement with the new legal 32 
standards; an attempt to maintain the control of local spaces of power). Among the 33 
peasants, however, some people have recently started to argue in favor of a 34 
process of adaptation to the legal and political context, while at the same time, 35 
preserving clear boundaries with respect to the competing indigenous 36 
organization.  Contrary to mainstream narratives of resistance, in this case, the 37 
self-identified peasants are those who are resisting, while the indigenous were 38 
more receptive with respect to new contextual incentives.  39 
Moreover, the analysis of this case demonstrates how the politics of 40 
recognition fail to take account of the inter-relational and fluid dynamics that 41 
characterize identity-building processes and, as a consequence, the performative 42 
potential embedded in the political and legal reforms they advocated. Nor is the 43 
affirmation of the coexistence of recognition and redistribution within certain 44 
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social claims able to account for the complexity of the problem. Attention should 1 
be devoted to the deconstruction and dissection of those claims, looking at their 2 
different components and socio-historical roots. This operation could lead to the 3 
identification of a ‘primacy’ either of recognition or redistribution, i.e. of a driving 4 
force underlying social conflicts. For instance, looking at the socio-historical 5 
context in which the Apolo conflict (and other similar ones) developed, the prime 6 
focus seems to lie with redistribution. Tellingly, no clear ethnic distinctions 7 
existed among the local population before the creation of the indigenous 8 
organization. The claim for recognition in this case is the result of the 9 
performative effects embedded in identity policies, which provide incentives for 10 
social groups to claim recognition for the sake of redistribution. A remark is in 11 
order to clarify that this argument does not question the ‘authenticity’ of collective 12 
identities, nor the legitimacy of the means utilized to reach social goals. In other 13 
words, no moral judgment is implied.  14 
The case of intra-societal conflicts related to land in Bolivia highlights the 15 
dissonance between goals and means that characterizes the culturalist and 16 
egalitarian explanatory arguments. Both these arguments are concerned with 17 
equality and redistribution. Multi-culturalist approaches put the issue of formal 18 
‘recognition’ at the center (i.e. a differentiation of legal and political treatment 19 
depending on ethno-cultural identities) as the only means for guaranteeing 20 
freedoms and as an effective principle of justice and equality among individuals 21 
and social groups. Liberal egalitarian approaches, in contrast, focus on the formal 22 
rules of societies, principally on economic redistribution to guarantee citizens 23 
equality, arguing that cultural freedom will be an implicit consequence of the 24 
correct functioning of a liberal egalitarian economic system. The formal absence 25 
of discrimination (‘natural liberty’, as Rawls calls it) would thus allow people to 26 
make use of their freedom in all its forms, without the need to differentiate among 27 
cultural, social, economic or political spheres.  28 
 Beyond the well known critical responses to both of these theoretical stances 29 
(Rudanko 2012), it has been rarely pointed out that both approaches share a 30 
common interpretative and normative disjuncture between the means and goals of 31 
their predicates: they look for (cultural) equality through the mea s of (economic) 32 
redistribution. In the case of theories of recognition, the economic elements have 33 
been almost completely neglected and are rarely addressed explicitly. However, 34 
multi-culturalist policy prescriptions are very much about the direct management 35 
of key material resources (from land and natural resources to more general access 36 
to state or international funding) and also have indirect effects that can hardly be 37 
understood without considering the more or less implicit economic incentives. In 38 
the case of egalitarian theories, culture is included in the principle of equality that 39 
is mainly achieved through economic redistributive measures, i.e. through a 40 
differentiated treatment of worst-off and best-off groups in society. 41 
 Ultimately, the conflicts between peasant and indigenous groups point to a 42 
dissonance between means and ends, showing the side effects of a regulatory 43 
system which aims to achieve ethno-cultural recognition by means of material 44 
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redistribution. Both recognition and redistribution could be valuable goals indeed, 1 
but problems arise when there is a lack of analytical clarity and normative 2 
consistency, and when either economic goods are considered exclusively for their 3 
social value or cultural goals are mainly shaped in material terms. In this sense, it 4 
is paramount to consider how norms work in terms of providing incentives, not 5 
simply recognizing rights. The mechanism would thus be a two-way flow: from 6 
claims to norms, but also from norms to claims. Social agency must thus be 7 
understood as the capacity of actors not only to modify the context, but also to 8 
adapt to contextual changes. The success of an organization is not determined 9 
exclusively by its capacity to make compelling claims to rights, but by its fitness 10 
with respect to a changing context.  11 
 Relying upon these observations and the empirical evidence presented, it is 12 
legitimate to wonder whether legal recognition of ethno-cultural groups through 13 
means of resource (land) redistribution is actually leading to an improvement in 14 
terms of social justice and rights for the whole population, or if it is rather framing 15 
a different balance of in qualities. As McNeish  (2012, 43) writes: ‘Although 16 
indigenous activism can be linked to social justice and inspire transformative 17 
visions, as a political order it can equally be motivated by different ideological 18 
positions, all of them able to effect exclusion or forced inclusion’. This issue is 19 
even more compelling in a context where basic subsistence resources are generally 20 
scarce for the whole population, which is forced to live in extreme poverty, and in 21 
a condition of social, political and economic marginalization and of progressive 22 
environmental degradation. 23 
(3) State vs civil society: this paper has instigated a third shift: from the 24 
classic dichotomous perspective of collective action studies – as well as of 25 
Marxism (Brass 1991) - which sets the state against society, towards an approach 26 
that focuses on endogenous social tensions and on intra-societal conflicts (rather 27 
than on social struggles against the state). By so doing, it contributes to a 28 
problematization of the widespread interpretation of civil society as a compact and 29 
relatively homogeneous group of actors. I argue that this dichotomous perspective 30 
(state vs society), as well as the assumed social homogeneity, constitute important 31 
analytical limits - if not normative biases - in understanding collective action 32 
dynamics. This is clear, for example, when social movements are assumed as 33 
agents of emancipation - i.e. as bearers of rights and citizenship claims - in 34 
opposition to a state that is systematically trying to limit social spaces of freedom 35 
and autonomy (Postero and Zamosc 2004). As contemporary Bolivian history 36 
shows, the boundaries between political and social spaces can sometimes be 37 
highly unstable and blurred, as can the multiple identities of social actors. 38 
Ultimately, the political geography of collective identities is always dependent on 39 
changing dynamics of power, mechanisms of differentiation, and social conflicts, 40 
which are related not only to the state but also takes place within society as such. 41 
Growing attention has been directed to new phenomena, in particular to 42 
social mobilizations for rights, recognition and citizenship, which are theoretically 43 
presented as a novelty with respect to previous phases (as suggested by the very 44 
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name of ‘new social movements’). This is sufficient to explain the growing 1 
interest in these phenomena, but does not justify the disappearance from the 2 
analytical framework of more ‘traditional’ variables, such as the economic 3 
dimension linked to resources. Intra-societal agrarian conflicts help to bring the 4 
economic and strategic elements back into the epistemological framework and to 5 
question a linear view of the relationship between claims, rights and social justice. 6 
It is ‘in the shadow’ of recognition that a more balanced understanding of the 7 
dynamics of contemporary social and resource conflict emerges.  8 
 9 
 10 
 11 
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Fig. 1: Multi-scale organogram of peasant and indigenous organizations (author’s elaboration). 
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Map. 1: Titled and claimed indigenous territories (TCOs) in Bolivia (source Fundación Tierra, 2010). 
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Map. 2: Titled and claimed indigenous territories (TCOs) in the region Amazonía Sur (including the 
TCO Leco of Apolo) (source Fundación Tierra, 2010). 
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